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THE ODDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
GEORGIA: MATHEMATICALLY EXPRESSED 
PROBABILITIES IN GEORGIA CRIMINAL 
TRIALS 
In 1982, a Georgia jury found Wayne Williams guilty of the 
murders of two young men. l The prosecution's case relied heavily 
on the significance of certain "fiber evidence," evidence that fibers 
recovered from the victims' bodies were similar to fibers found in 
Williams' home and car.2 The prosecution used mathematical cal-
culations of probability, in expert testimony and in closing argu-
ment, to demonstrate the significance of the fibers' similarity.3 On 
appeal, Williams contended that the expert testimony should not 
have been admitted and that the prosecutor's argument had been 
improper." The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, in an opinion 
written by Justice Bell, rejected Williams' contentions with almost 
no comment. I; Thus, whether the use of probabilities in evidence or 
in argument might ever be considered improper in a Georgia crimi-
nal trial remains an unanswered question. 
This Note suggests that a need exists in Georgia for the articula-
tion of standards regarding two related questions. First, when 
should evidence consisting of mathematically expressed probabili-
ties be admissible in a criminal trial to prove a connection between 
the defendant and the charged offense? Second, what should be 
the scope of permissible use of mathematically expressed 
probabilities in the prosecution's closing argument? The majority 
1. See Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 749, 312 S.E.2d 40, 48 (1983). On February 27, 
1982, Williams was convicted of murdering Nathaniel Cater and Jimmy Ray Payne. ld. 
A motion for a new trial was denied on December 16, 1982. ld. The Supreme Court of 
Georgia affirmed the denial on December 5, 1983 (rehearing denied on January 18, 
1984). ld. at 809, 312 S.E.2d at 40. Williams was sentenced to serve two consecutive 
life sentences. ld. at 749, 312 S.E.2d at 48. 
2. C/. id. at 821, 312 S.E.2d at 96 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting the central role of 
fiber evidence in the Williams case). 
3. See Transcript at 2285-91, 6881-83, File No. A-56186, State v. Williams (Fulton 
County Super. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Transcript]; Williams, 251 Ga. at 786, 
312 S.E.2d at 72-73. 
4. Williams, 251 Ga. at 786, 312 S.E.2d at 72. 
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opinion in Williams v. State6 will be considered as an example of 
Georgia's current approach to these questions. 
The concept of "probability" is related to many aspects of the 
legal process of fact finding. For example, in civil cases, determina-
tions of fact are usually based on a preponderance of the evidence, 
a "more-probable-than-not" standard. In criminal cases, on the 
other hand, guilt must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," a 
standard which suggests that a very high probability of guilt must 
be established, although absolute certainty of guilt is not required. 
A jury's assessments of probability are usually arrived at in a 
nonmathematical way. Sometimes, however, the jury must consider 
probabilities expressed in mathematical terms. This Note is con-
cerned only with the use in evidence and argument of those state-
ments of probability which are herein termed "mathematically ex-
pressed probabilities." 
As used in this Note, a "mathematically expressed probability" 
means either a statement which purports to quantify the 
probability of a certain event's occurrence or a statement which 
contains at least one numerical term implying such a quantified 
assessment of probability. Consider the following examples. The 
statement "It is quite likely that you have a talking dog" is not a 
mathematically expressed probability; no quantified assessment of 
probability is stated or implied. The statement "There is a seventy 
percent chance that your dog will speak" expresses a quantified 
assessment of probability and thus is a mathematically expressed 
probability. The purpose of this Note is to elucidate the poten-
tially unfair use of such expressions of probability in criminal 
trials. 
I. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF MATHEMATICALLY EXPRESSED 
PROBABILITIES 
During a criminal trial, the prosecution can present mathemati-
cally expressed probabilities to the jury either as evidence (often in 
the form of expert testimony) or during closing arguments. The 
focus of this section is the admissibility of such probabilities as 
evidence. This section examines generally the potentially prejudi-
cial nature of expert assessments of probability and discusses spe-
cifically the expert testimony admitted in the Georgia murder trial 
of Wayne Williams. 
6. 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983). 
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A. The Potential for Prejudice Inherent in Evidence of 
Mathematically Expressed Probabilities 
133 
Evidence consisting of reliable mathematically expressed 
probabilities can sometimes help the fact finder by providing a 
reasoned basis for deciding whether a particular fact has been es-
tablished.7 Statistical interpretations of otherwise unmanageable 
collections of data can be particularly helpfu1.8 For example, courts 
have considered what percentage of a community's population is 
made up of a certain ethnic group in determining the existence of 
bias in the community's jury selection process.9 The usefulness of 
such statistical evidence will often depend on its being expressed 
in mathematical terms; an otherwise vague expert opinion may be-
come clearer and more helpful if supported or illustrated by statis-
tical evidence.1o 
Notwithstanding the usefulness of reliable probability evi-
dence,l1 several jurisdictions have limited the admissibility of such 
evidence in criminal trials.12 Probability evidence is often intro-
duced through expert testimony because of the general rule 
prohibiting lay witnesses from stating opinions or inferences.13 The 
7. CI. Reich, How to Evaluate an Expert's Statistical Analysis, 28 PRAC. LAW., Apr. 
15, 1982, at 69, 69 (observing an increase in the use of statistical analysis to resolve 
factual issues); Note, Statistics in the Law: Potential Problems in the Presentation of 
Statistical Evidence, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 335-36 (1983) (noting the impor-
tance of statistical evidence in complex litigation or cases involving numerical 
measurem~nt). 
8. See Note, supra note 7, at 313, 336-37. 
9. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). Such a percentage is a math-
ematically expressed probability because the percentage implies the probability of the 
occurrence of an event. For example, the statement "Twenty-five percent of Green 
County's population consists of green people" implies that there is a 25% probability 
(i.e., a one-in-four chance) that a person chosen at random from the population of 
Green County will be green. 
10. For example, an expert's opinion that "a significant number" of certain medical 
cases are fatal would be clarified by supporting statistics which show that 45% of 
those cases reported have proved fatal. 
11. For convenience, the terms "probabilities," "probability evidence," and 
"probability testimony" are sometimes used in this Note to refer to statements of 
mathematically expressed probabilities. 
12. See United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979); Miller v. State, 240 
Ark. 340, 399 S.W.2d 268 (1966); People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33,66 Cal. 
Rptr. 497 (1968); State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39, 434 N.E.2d 997 (1982); State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 
480 (Minn. 1983); State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978); State v. Sneed, 76 
N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 108 N.E. 200 
(1915). 
13. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 701; D.C.G.A. § 24-9-65 (1982) (limiting admissibility of opin-
ion testimony generally); Fed. R. Evid. 702; D.C.G.A. § 24-9-67 (1982) (permitting ex-
3
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evidentiary rules governing expert opinions have sometimes been 
applied in finding certain mathematically expressed probabilities 
inadmissible.14 Other courts have indicated that probability testi-
mony should be inadmissible unless the specific methodology un-
derlying the expert's opinion has been proven valid or reliable.1l5 
pert opinion testimony). 
14. Expert probability testimony might be excluded because: the witness is not com-
petent as an expert to testify about mathematically expressed probabilities, cf. Com-
monwealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39, 49-51, 434 N.E.2d 997, 1005-06 (1982) (finger-
print expert's testimony regarding probability of criminal identification erroneously 
admitted because not accompanied by expert explanation of underlying calculations); 
the expert's opinion is based on sheer conjecture, see Miller v. State, 240 Ark. 340, 
343-44, 399 S.W.2d 268, 270 (1966); the expert's opinion is based on another expert's 
opinion, see People v. Collins, 43 Mich. App. 259, 268, 204 N.W.2d 290, 295 (1972); or 
the expert's opinion is based on other sources of information not presented to the jury, 
ct. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 75-76, 268 S.E.2d 906, 912 (1980) (erroneous admission 
of testimony based on nonprobabilistic mathematical calculations). 
15. Cf. Miller v. State, 240 Ark. 340, 343-44, 399 S.W.2d 268, 270 (1966) (finding 
error in admission of "unsubstantiated, speculative testimony on probabilities"); State 
v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 354, 414 P.2d 858, 862 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding probability 
evidence inadmissible "to identify a defendant in a criminal proceeding so long as the 
odds are based on estimates, the validity of which have [sic] not been demonstrated"). 
Consider the following example of a statistically invalid procedure used in People v. 
Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). The prosecutor assigned 
estimated probabilities of randomly selecting people who share certain characteristics 
with the supposed perpetrators of a robbery. The characteristics and the assigned 
probabilities that a person would possess the characteristics were as follows: 
Characteristic Individual Probability 
A. Partly yellow automobile 
B. Man with mustache 
C. Girl with ponytail 
D. Girl with blond hair 
E. Negro man with beard 
F. Interracial couple in car 







The prosecutor argued that, according to the "product rule" testified to by a mathe-
matics expert, the odds of a particular couple possessing all the characteristics equaled 
the product of all the individual probabilities, or 1/12,000,000 (one in twelve million). 
Because the defendants possessed all the characteristics on the list, "it was to be in-
ferred that there could be but one chance in 12 million that defendants were innocent 
.... " Id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 50!. 
The "product rule" can be used properly to determine the odds of multiple events 
occurring in combination. For example, in a random selection of one playing card from 
a deck of 52 cards, there is a 1/52 chance of selecting the two of diamonds. The 
probability that the two of diamonds would be selected twice in only two trials is 1/52 
multiplied by 1/52, which equals 1/2,704. See id. at 325 & n.8, 438 P.2d at 36 & n.8, 66 
Cal. Rptr. at 500 & n.8. However, this simple "product rule" is only valid when the 
multiple events are independent of one another. Because the Collins prosecution never 
demonstrated the independence of the characteristics used in its calculations, the 
court found the method of calculation to be statistically invalid. See id. at 328-29, 438 
P.2d at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503. 
4
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Such a required showing of reliable statistical procedure is analo-
gous to the judicial tests used to determine the admissibility of 
other evidence based on unfamiliar scientific principles or proce-
dures. I6 The primary concern, however, of the courts which have 
considered the admissibility of mathematically expressed 
probabilities has been the unfairly prejudicial effect on a jury of 
incompetent or unreliable probability testimony. 
Some courts have indicated that a jury might be unable to assess 
properly the significance of mathematically expressed probabilities 
in relation to other evidence of guilt or innocence.I7 If the jurors do 
not understand the mathematical basis of the expert's opinion, 
they will not know how much weight to give the expert's testi-
mony.IS Even when probability evidence is substantiated and sci-
entifically sound, the expert's opinion is still a mathematical ex-
pression whose ramifications the jury might not be able to 
understand completely.I9 Although a jury might similarly be mysti-
fied by the technical details underlying other types of expert testi-
mony, there is a greater potential for prejudicial confusion and dis-
traction inherent in the use of mathematically expressed 
probabilities.20 
16. In Miller and Sneed, the courts treated speculative probability evidence as anal-
ogous to evidence based on unverified scientific principles. See Miller, 240 Ark. at 344, 
399 S.W.2d at 270; Sneed, 76 N.M. at 353-54, 414 P.2d at 861-62. 
The test in many jurisdictions for the admissibility of evidence based on scientific 
principles originated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under 
Frye, scientific evidence is admissible only when the principle on which it is based is 
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs." Frye, 293 F. at 1014. See also United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 
556 (6th Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, has explicitly rejected 
the Frye rule, stating that "'counting heads' in the scientific community is not an 
appropriate way to determine the admissibility of a scientific procedure .... " Harper 
v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (1982). The Harper court held that the 
trial judge must determine "whether the procedure or technique in question has 
reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty, . . . whether the procedure 'rests upon 
the laws of nature.''' Id. (quoting 1. Younger, Lectures on Evidence, Nat'l Prac. Inst., 
Continuing Professional Education Lectures Series (1980». The trial judge is author-
ized, under Harper, to base the determination on any of four specified factors: (1) 
evidence presented at trial, including expert testimony; (2) exhibits; (3) treatises; or 
(4) the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions. See id. 
17. See Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 332, 438 P.2d at 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505; State v. 
Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. 1978). 
18. See Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 330-31, 438 P.2d at 40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. 
19. See Carlson, 267 N.W.2d at 176; ct. United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 
680 F.2d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 1982) (expressing concern about jury comprehension and 
confusion, although finding no violation of defendant's right to a fair trial). 
20. See infra text, section III for further discussion of difficulties peculiar to mathe-
matically expressed probabilities. 
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Consider the following hypothetical example. X is on trial for 
the murder of Y. There were no eyewitnesses to the killing, but 
police discovered an imprint made by a very rare style of shoe at 
the crime scene. The prosecution's expert testifies that only 200 
pairs of shoes have been sold in the United States which could 
match the imprint found at the crime scene. The expert testifies 
that the probability of choosing a person in the United States at 
random who has a similar pair of shoes is about 200/200,000,000 or 
one in a million. X has a pair of shoes which matches the imprint. 
X also has a blood type which he shares with only ten percent of 
the United States populace. Blood of the same type was found on 
and near Y's body, although Y had a different blood type. The ex-
pert testifies that the probability of randomly choosing a person 
who has the same blood type as X and who also has a similar pair 
of shoes is 1/10 multiplied by 1,000,000, which equals 
1/10,000,000. Even if the expert's calculation were correct,21 what 
should the jury do with the information? The significance of the 
odds in relation to the issue of X's guilt is uncertain, although such 
a mathematical demonstration might convince some jurors that X 
is a murderer, especially after repeated references to "one in ten 
million" by the prosecutor. 
Logically, however, X's guilt is far from proved by the odds 
alone. First, there is no evidence that the shoe imprint and the 
blood were left by the same person. Second, there is no evidence 
that either the blood or the imprint was left by Y's killer. Third, 
the odds themselves (one in ten million) indicate that out of 
200,000,000 people in the United States, one might expect that 
twenty people have the same kind of blood and shoes as X. There 
is no evidence indicating that X is more likely the killer than any 
other person with the same kind of shoes and blood type. The 
point of this example is that a juror unfamiliar with statistical in-
terpretation might be incapable of determining the significance 
which should be attached to mathematically expressed 
probabilities. 
One aspect of probability evidence which increases its potential 
prejudicial effect is that effective cross-examination may be impos-
sible, either because of the limited scientific knowledge of defense 
counselor because of a hidden bias in the expert's method of cal-
21. The calculation is not correct, in fact. It does not account for similar shoes sold 
outside the United States, it relies on an estimated 200 million population, and it 
relies on an assumption that each purchaser bought only one pair of similar shoes. 
6
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culation.22 Cross-examination to reveal bias or methodological 
flaws might be difficult whenever any scientific expert testifies, 
but the risk of resulting prejudice is greater when the expert is 
giving probability testimony. Because laymen are acquainted with 
the general concepts of "odds" and "chances," the risk is greater 
that a juror might accept an expert's assessment of probability 
merely because "it sounds right" or because of the juror's vague 
belief that "numbers don't lie." The danger is that one erroneous 
calculation might be accepted as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.23 Of course, the defense might present its own expert whose 
opinions would be more favorable to the defendant, but this might 
not solve the underlying problem of potential prejudice which re-
sults from a juror's inability to recognize that he may be misled by 
an impressive show of numbers with little probative value.24 
A "battle of experts" is risky in that it can result in overempha-
sis of evidence that is of limited collateral importance. Some courts 
have expressed concern that mathematically expressed probabili-
ties might distract a jury from deciding the proper factual issues of 
the case.211 For example, consider a hypothetical murder trial in 
which the prosecution offers evidence that a hair from the defen-
dant's head was found on the victim's body. Even if it were undis-
puted that the hair was the defendant's, that fact could not prop-
erly be regarded as more than a single link in a chain of inferences 
needed to prove the defendant's guilt. A prosecution expert, how-
ever, might testify extensively as to the reliability of identification 
through hair analysis tests and conclude that there is only one 
chance in a thousand that the hair does not belong to the defen-
dant. A jury relying on the assumed infallibility of science might 
confuse identification of the defendant as the owner of the hair 
with identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime. The danger is even greater if defense counsel is forced to 
mount his own expert attack in an attempt to rebut the prosecu-
22. See Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 330-31, 438 P.2d at 40-41,66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. 
23. Cf. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d at 176 ("Testimony expressing opinions or conclusions 
in terms of statistical probabilities can make the uncertain seem all but proven ... "), 
quoted in United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1979). 
24. See Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 330-32, 438 P.2d at 40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05; 
State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Minn. 1983); Carlson, 267 N.W.2d at 176; Tribe, 
Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
1329, 1355 (1971). For further discussion of the increased danger of prejudice peculiar 
to mathematically expressed probabilities, see infra text, section III. 
25. See Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 327, 438 P.2d at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502; Boyd, 331 
N.W.2d at 482-83; Note, supra note 7, at 334-35. 
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tion's probability evidence. With so much effort devoted to con-
testing the defendant's connection to the hair, the jury might for-
get the logical necessity of finding a connection between the hair 
and the murderer.26 
B. The Admissibility of Mathematically Expressed 
Probabilities in Williams v. State 
N either the Supreme Court of Georgia nor the Georgia Court of 
Appeals has produced a majority opinion analyzing the potential 
difficulties associated with the admissibility of mathematically ex-
pressed probabilities,27 although the issue was raised on appeal in 
Williams v. State.28 The majority opinion in Williams, however, 
approves summarily and uncritically the admission of expert 
probability testimony. 
Expert testimony was used in the murder trial of Wayne Wil-
liams to demonstrate a physical link between Williams and the two 
victims with whose murders Williams was charged. Two experts, 
FBI special agent Deadman and State Crime Laboratory microana-
lyst Peterson, testified at length about various comparison tests 
they had performed on small fibers found on the bodies of the vic-
tims and fibers found in the home and other environments of Wil-
liams.29 The experts explained in detail the fiber comparison tests 
and the distinguishing characteristics of fibers upon which they 
based their comparisons.30 Each expert testified that, in his opin-
ion, it was "virtually impossible" for there to have been no contact 
26. See Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 330-32, 438 P.2d at 40-41,66 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. It is 
true that a jury might be distracted by nonmathematically expressed opinions regard-
ing the halr's origin; the problem of jury distraction is not unique to opinions couched 
in mathematical terms. The danger of distraction increases, however, as the amount of 
detailed information increases. Thus, a jury haggling over numbers representing de-
grees of likelihood that the hair is defendant's will be more distracted than a jury not 
concerned about the significance of a precise quantification. 
27. During the final four months of 1983, however, two nonmajority appellate opin-
ions in Georgia discussed the use of mathematically expressed probabilities in criminal 
trials. These opinions were in Graham v. State, 168 Ga. App. 23, 308 S.E.2d 413 (1983) 
(Deen, J., concurring specially), and Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 
(1983) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
28. 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983). 
29. [d. at 755-60, 312 S.E.2d at 52-55. Expert fiber testimony relating to 10 extrinsic 
offenses (alleged homicides with which Williams was not charged) was also admitted 
by the trial court. See id. at 755, 312 S.E.2d at 5]. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
rejected Williams' contention that evidence of the extrinsic offenses should have been 
excluded. See id. at 785, 312 S.E.2d at 71. 
30. See id. at 755-56, 312 S.E.2d at 52; Transcript, supra note 3, at 2026-2275. 
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between the victims and Williams or his environment.31 
Each expert also testified as to certain mathematically expressed 
probabilities which were related to the fiber comparisons.32 
Deadman testified that once he determined that two fibers were 
similar (Le., that they displayed no "significant" differences),33 a 
further determination was necessary to evaluate the significance of 
the similarity.34 Deadman explained that the significance of a fiber 
match depends in part on whether the fibers in question occur 
commonly or relatively rarely in the general environment.311 Al-
though the experts never attempted to quantify the significance of 
the fiber similarities they reported, the relative rarity of two kinds 
of fibers tested by the experts was illustrated by mathematical cal-
culations in order to maximize the significance of the fiber 
matches.3s 
One type of uncommon fiber which the experts found similar to 
fibers recovered from victims' bodies came from the rayon floor-
board carpet of a 1970 Chevrolet station wagon driven by Williams 
when the police first questioned him.37 Both experts testified that 
they had information that only 620 out of over two million cars in 
the Atlanta area had that kind of carpet.3S 
The second type of fiber considered unique by the prosecution 
31. See Williams, 251 Ga. at 821, 312 S.E.2d at 96 (Smith, J., dissenting). Note that 
an expert opinion that the occurrence of an event is "virtually impossible" is not tech-
nically a mathematically expressed probability. Nevertheless, if such an opinion is ac-
tually based on erroneous or misleading probabilities, the opinion itself might be con-
sidered unfairly prejudicial or incompetent. Justice Smith, dissenting in Williams, felt 
that all of Deadman's probability evidence was incompetent and that Deadman's ulti-
mate conclusion ("virtually impossible") was therefore inadmissible. See id. at 826, 312 
S.E.2d at 99 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
32. For example, the experts testified that they received information (apparently 
supplied by General Motors) that only 620 out of over two million cars in the Atlanta 
area would have the same type of carpet as Williams' car. ld. at 824, 312 S.E.2d at 98 
(Smith, J., dissenting). 
33. Whether an observed difference between two fibers is "significant" is, of course, 
a matter of opinion. 
34. See Transcript, supra note 3, at 2068. 
35. ld. at 2068-69. Deadman illustrated this point by using as an example white 
cotton fibers which might be found in a t-shirt. Associating such a common fiber with 
both the victim and the suspect would be of very little significance. 
36. See Williams, 251 Ga. at 821-24, 312 S.E.2d at 96-98 (Smith, J., dissenting); 
Transcript, supra note 3, at 2285-91. The prosecution, however, did attempt to quanti-
fy the significance of the fiber associations in closing argument. See Transcript, supra 
note 3, at 6881-83. 
37. See Williams, 251 Ga. at 822, 312 S.E.2d at 97 (Smith, J., dissenting). Ct. id. at 
756-72, 312 S.E.2d at 52-63 (listing various alleged fiber associations between Williams 
and each homicide victim). 
38. See id. at 824, 312 S.E.2d at 98 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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was identified as 181-b nylon, manufactured by the Wellman com-
pany.39 Fibers similar to 181-b were recovered from the victims' 
bodies and taken from Williams' green bedroom carpet.40 There 
was testimony that Williams' carpet was similar to "Luxaire" 
brand carpet, produced in limited quantity by West Point Pep-
perell from 181-b fiber during 1970-71.41 In order to establish that 
Williams had been in contact with the victims, the prosecutor elic-
ited from Deadman a series of mathematical calculations culminat-
ing in Deadman's opinion that the odds of finding carpet similar to 
that of Williams in an Atlanta area home chosen at random were 
one in 7,792.42 Deadman admitted that his opinion was merely an 
estimate based in part on assumptions which were not verifiable.43 
Deadman's calculation was an estimate of the probability that a 
random Atlanta area household would contain Luxaire carpet, a 
brand of carpet similar to that found in Williams' home. This 
probability could, in theory, be calculated accurately by dividing 
the total number of Atlanta area households into the number of 
such households which contain Luxaire carpet.44 Deadman derived 
an estimate of the number of Atlanta area households containing 
Luxaire carpet from West Point Pepperell sales records.45 The 
records used by Deadman reflected the combined sales of Luxaire 
carpet and another brand, Dreamer carpet, during 1971 and 1972. 
During 1971-72 the combined sales of both brands totaled about 
16,397 square yards in a ten-state region including Georgia."6 
39. See id. at 757, 312 S.E.2d at 53; id. at 822-23, 312 S.E.2d at 97 (Smith, J., dis-
senting). Ct. id. at 756-72,312 S.E.2d at 52-63 (listing various alleged fiber associations 
between Williams and each homicide victim). 
40. See id. at 756-72, 312 S.E.2d at 52-63. 
41. See id. at 757-58, 312 S.E.2d at 53; Transcript, supra note 3, at 2285-88. 
42. See Williams, 251 Ga. at 824, 312 S.E.2d at 98 (Smith, J., dissenting); Tran-
script, supra note 3, at 2291. 
43. See Transcript, supra note 3, at 2291. 
44. If it is not clear why the number of households containing Luxaire divided by 
the total number of households equals the probability of randomly selecting a house-
hold containing Luxaire, consider the following explanation. In general, if x and y are 
numbers, and if a set which consists of only two types of items contains x items of one 
type and y items of a second type, then the probability that an item chosen at random 
from the set will be of the second type is y/(x+y). Thus, out of a set of six red shoes 
and four black shoes, the probability that a randomly chosen shoe will be black is 
4/(4+6) or 4/10. Out of a set of x households without Luxaire carpet and y households 
with Luxaire carpet, the probability that a randomly selected household will contain 
Luxaire carpet is y/(x+y), which is the number of households containing Luxaire di-
vided by the total number of households. 
45. See Transcript, supra note 3, at 2285-91. 
46. ld. at 2289. 
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Deadman treated this combined sales total as an adequate 
approximation of the amount of Luxaire carpet which might have 
ended up in the ten-state region.47 Deadman estimated that twenty 
square yards was a reasonable amount of carpet for an average 
room and concluded that carpeting for approximately 820 rooms 
had been sold for residential use in the ten-state region.48 
Deadman assumed that ten percent of the carpet sold in the ten-
state region would be sold in Georgia.49 Therefore, he concluded, 
one might expect to find eighty-two rooms carpeted with Luxaire 
in Georgia.50 In order to narrow the focus from Georgia to Atlanta, 
Deadman assumed that all eighty-two rooms of Luxaire would be 
in Atlanta.lil This assumption, considered by the prosecution to be 
"very, very beneficial to the defense,"52 would make Luxaire seem 
more common in the Atlanta area. Deadman made another as-
sumption which the prosecution considered favorable to the defen-
dant; he assumed that each house containing Luxaire had only one 
room carpeted with it, thus maximizing the total number of house-
holds expected to contain Luxaire.153 Therefore, according to 
Deadman, eighty-two households in the Atlanta area might be ex-
pected to contain Luxaire carpet.54 Finally, using a figure for the 
number of Atlanta area housing units obtained from the Atlanta 
Regional Commission and his calculations based on Luxaire carpet 
sales records, Deadman estimated that the odds of a randomly se-
lected household containing carpet similar to that of Williams were 
82/638,992 or one in 7,792.155 
It is clear that Deadman's testimony consisted of mathematically 
expressed probabilities and that it was intended to forge a link in a 
47. Deadman's use of combined sales figures for Luxaire and Dreamer carpets in 
1971-72 was, at best, a very rough approximation of the actual amount of Luxaire 
carpet in the ten-state region. Moreover, possible sales after 1972 were not considered, 
and the figures did not account for carpet of less than first quality which was disposed 
of in different ways. Ct. id. at 2007-09 (testimony relating to separate sales records for 
first-quality merchandise). 
48. Transcript. supra note 3, at 2290. 
49.Id. 
50. Id. Deadman's assumption that Georgia received 10% of the carpet sold in the 
ten-state region had a large impact on the calculation of the carpet's "rarity" in Geor-
gia. Suppose, for example, that 90(':" rather than 10%, was sold in Georgia. This would 
result in an estimated 738 rooms in Georgia with Luxaire carpet, rather than only 82 
rooms. 
51. Id. at 2291. 
52. Id. at 6881. 
5:3. Id. at 2291, 6881. 
54. Id. at 2290-91. 
55. See id. at 2291. 
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chain of inferences which would identify Williams as the guilty 
party. Although Deadman drew no further inferences suggesting a 
correlation between the calculations and Williams' guilt, the calcu-
lations themselves would be scrutinized closely by some courts. 
The probability testimony suffered from three defects which, in 
other jurisdictions, might have justified a finding that the trial 
court erred in admitting the testimony. First, Deadman's opinion 
was based in part on purely speculative estimates.56 There was no 
support for his assumption that only ten percent of the Luxaire 
and Dreamer carpets was sold in Georgia or for his assumptions 
regarding the distribution of those carpets within the state and 
within the Atlanta area. Furthermore, the logical relevance of 
Deadman's entire series of calculations hinged upon a crucial but 
unacknowledged assumption-that Williams' carpet actually was 
Luxaire.57 Although there was testimony that Williams' carpet was 
similar to Luxaire, that testimony was not based on microscopic 
comparisons of individual fibers.58 Justice Smith's dissent in Wil-
liams refers to the identification of Williams' carpet as Luxaire as 
a "wholly speculative assumption."59 As viewed by the Kansas Su-
preme Court, "Expert testimony of mathematical probabilities. . . 
is generally inadmissible when based on estimations rather than on 
established facts."6o Moreover, the unreliability of the expert's un-
derlying assumptions is not cured merely by his assigning specula-
tive estimates which seem "fair" to the defendant.61 
Second, Deadman's testimony, like the probabilities used in 
People v. Collins,62 "lacked an adequate foundation ... in statisti-
cal theory."63 The sales figures used in Deadman's calculations re-
56. The supreme courts of Arkansas and New Mexico have held probability evi-
dence in criminal trials inadmissible when based on speculative estimates. See Miller 
v. State, 240 Ark. 340, 344, 399 S.W.2d 268, 270 (1966); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 
354,414 P.2d 858, 862 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
57. See Williams, 251 Ga. at 823-24, 824 n.7, 312 S.E.2d at 97-98, 98 n.7 (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
58. See id. at 757-58,312 S.E.2d at 53. The prosecution presented testimony based 
on microscopic comparison of Williams' carpet to 181-b fiber, but not to individual 
fibers of Luxaire carpet. See id. at 757, 312 S.E.2d at 53. 
59. [d. at 823-24, 312 S.E.2d at 98 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
60. State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 58-59, 622 P.2d 986, 994 (1981). 
61. "Guesses, even by experts, are still guesses and should not be allowed due to the 
prejudicial effect they may have on defendants." Braun, Quantitatiue Analysis and 
the Law: Probability Theory as a Tool of Euidence in Criminal Trials, 1982 UTAH L. 
REV. 41, 62. 
62. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). 
63. [d. at 327,438 P.2d at 38,66 Cal. Rptr. at 502. In Collins, a procedure properly 
applicable only to independent variables was erroneously applied to variables whose 
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flected only sales of first-quality carpet.64 Additional quantities of 
Luxaire carpet were sold as "imperfect" merchandise, some of 
which might have been distributed in Georgia or even installed in 
Atlanta residences.65 Deadman's failure to consider these addi-
tional quantities of Luxaire carpet indicates unreliability in his 
method of calculation. Furthermore, the expert's testimony was 
supposedly relevant to proving the rarity of a certain type of fiber 
(181-b nylon) in the general environment.66 Deadman's method of 
calculation, however, did not account for all the Luxaire carpet 
produced nor for all the 181-b fiber distributed in Georgia.67 More-
over, since Deadman restricted the scope of his calculations to 
households, his method failed to take into account the non-
residential portions of the Atlanta environment. Therefore, 
Deadman erroneously relied on statistics which could not be used 
to form a valid opinion relevant to the rarity of 181-b fiber in the 
general environment of Atlanta.68 
Third, Deadman's testimony might be regarded by some courts 
as a use of mathematically expressed probabilities which could 
confuse a jury by focusing the jury's attention on a collateral is-
sue.69 Once a juror is convinced that Luxaire is indeed very rare, 
will the juror remember that there is a chance that Williams' car-
independence had not been demonstrated. See supra note 15. In Williams, Deadman's 
calculations might have been considered invalid because the statistical data relied 
upon were speculative and selected so as to exclude significant factors necessary to a 
relevant conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59. 
64. See Brief on Behalf of the Appellant at 121, Williams [hereinafter cited as Ap-
pellant's Brief]; ct. Transcript, supra note 3, at 2007-09 (testimony relating to separate 
sales records for first-quality merchandise). 
65. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 121. 
66. The significance of a fiber association between the victim and the suspect de-
pends in part on whether the fibers are of a type which occurs only rarely in the gen-
eral environment. See Transcript, supra note 3, at 2068-69 (Deadman's testimony); 
supra text accompanying notes 34-35; supra note 35. 
67. West Point Pepperell, the maker of Luxaire carpet, was not the only Georgia 
purchaser of 181-b nylon. According to sales figures in State's Exhibit 622, as much as 
94~{, of the 181-b fiber sold in Georgia might have been unaccounted for in Deadman's 
calculations. Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 120; see Transcript, supra note 3, at 
7492-93. 
68. Deadman's own assessment of the validity of his probability testimony was pub-
lished after the trial and appeal of Williams. See Deadman, Fiber Evidence and the 
Wayne Williams Trial (Conclusion), 53 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., May 1984, at 
10. In his opinion, "The probability figures illustrate clearly that the Williams' carpet 
is, in fact, very uncommon." Id. at 13. 
69. Prejudicial confusion of the jury has been a primary concern of the courts which 
have addressed the admissibility of probability evidence. See supra notes 17-26 and 
accompanying text. 
13
Johnson: The Odds of Criminal Justice in Georgia:  Mathematically Expresse
Published by Reading Room, 1984
HeinOnline -- 1 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 144 1984-1985
144 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:131 
pet was not Luxaire? Once a juror is told that the odds of finding 
Luxaire carpet in a random Atlanta household are one in 7,792, 
will the juror remember that those odds were derived from other 
numbers indicating that eighty-one Atlanta homes other than the 
defendant's contain the "rare" carpet? Finally, once a juror is con-
vinced that Williams' carpet was the very rare Luxaire, will the 
juror remember that proof of a physical Hnk between a homicide 
victim and a defendant is not equivalent to proof that the defen-
dant is a murderer? 
The Supreme Court or Georgia, in its majority opinion affirming 
Williams' conviction, mentioned none of the above infirmities of 
Deadman's testimony. In a single sentence, Justice Bell disposed of 
Williams' claim that Deadman's probability testimony was errone-
ously admitted: "[E]xperts are permitted to give their opinions, 
based upon their knowledge, including mathematical computa-
tions."7o The only case cited in support of this proposition was 
Stewart v. StateY In Stewart, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
found that the Director of the Chattooga County Department of 
Family and Children Services had been qualified as an expert wit-
ness and was competent to testify as to the amount of public assis-
tance funds which the defendant had been entitled to receive.72 
The expert testimony in Stewart had nothing to do with poten-
tially confusing and complex statistical computations. Therefore, 
the precedential value of Stewart seems quite limited in a situa-
tion involving expert probability testimony. 
Furthermore, in Stewart, the court found the Director's expert 
testimony, to be defective, although not because it relied on her 
mathematical computations. The Director's computations were 
based on departmental regulations which were not in evidence nor 
examinable by the jury.73 The court stated: "Where an expert tes-
tifies to a conclusion based on information furnished by 
others . . . , then all the information utilized by that expert in 
forming an opinion should be presented to the jury to enable the 
jury to evaluate the expert's testimony."74 The reasoning of Stew-
art would therefore support the exclusion of Deadman's testimony 
based on information furnished by others and not in evidence.715 
70. Williams, 251 Ga. at 786, 312 S.E.2d at 72. 
71. 246 Ga. 70, 268 S.E.2d 906 (1980). 
72. See id. at 75, 268 S.E.2d at 911. 
73. Id. at 75-76, 268 S.E.2d at 912. 
74. Id. at 76, 268 S.E.2d at 912. 
75. See Williams, 251 Ga. at 825, 312 S.E.~d at 98 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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The Williams majority apparently considered Deadman's 
mathematical computations to be based on his knowledge and 
therefore admissible as an expert opinion.76 Although Deadman's 
method of deriving the probability was explained, his use of specu-
lative estimates and secondhand information undercuts the relia-
bility of his method and the trustworthiness of his results. In light 
of Deadman's reliance on unverified assumptions, it seems inap-
propriate to justify the admission of his testimony as being based 
on his knowledge. 
Justice Bell's opinion did not address the potential of 
probability evidence to mislead, confuse or distract the jury. The 
jury's perception of the expert testimony is particularly important 
in Williams because of the prosecution's emphasis on mathemati-
cally expressed probabilities during its closing argument.77 
Consideration by the court of the various problems raised by the 
use of mathematically expressed probabilities would not neces-
sarily have resulted in a reversal of Williams' conviction. Other 
courts have held the improper admission of such evidence to be 
harmless error.78 The Georgia court could have found that admit-
ting Deadman's probability testimony was harmless error because 
the testimony was merely corroborative of other nonmathemati-
cally expressed opinions.79 Instead, the court approved the admis-
sion of the testimony with almost no comment. In the absence of 
standards specifically governing the admissibility of probability 
evidence, Williams might be relied upon as permitting the use of 
mathematically expressed probabilities even when the probabilities 
are based on speculative estimates and are only tenuously related 
to an expert's field of competence. 
II. THE PROSECUTION'S USE OF MATHEMATICALLY EXPRESSED 
PROBABILITIES IN CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Whether or not probability evidence has been introduced at 
trial, a prosecutor may try to persuade the jury by using mathe-
matically expressed probabilities in closing argument. The focus of 
this section is such prosecutorial argument rather than the admis-
76. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
77. See infra text accompanying notes 110-21. 
78. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39, 50-51, 434 N.E.2d 997, 1006 
(1982); State v. Carlson, 267 N:W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. 1978). 
79. Both experts testified that it was "virtually impossible" that the victims had not 
been in contact with Williams or his environment. Williams, 251 Ga. at 821, 312 
S.E.2d at 96 (Smith, J., dissenting). Cf. supra note 31. 
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sibility of expert probability testimony. This section considers the 
traditional bounds of argument, the special considerations which 
may pertain to the argument of mathematically expressed 
probabilities, and the prosecution's argument in the Georgia mur-
der trial of Wayne Williams. 
A. The Scope of Permissible Argument and Inference by a 
Prosecutor 
Generally, an attorney is allowed considerable latitude in his ar-
gument to the jury.80 The attorney may draw any inference from 
the evidence admitted at trial, even unreasonable, illogical or ab-
surd inferences.61 The scope of permissible argument is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court.82 There are, however, certain 
restrictions on the latitude enjoyed by the prosecution in its clos-
ing argument which are germane to this discussion: the prosecution 
may not make statements which would impair the defendant's con-
stitutional right to a fair trial, and the prosecution may not mis-
state the testimony or introduce facts which are not in evidence.83 
Courts outside of Georgia have considered various factors in de-
ciding whether a prosecutor's argument of mathematically ex-
pressed probabilities has denied the defendant a fair trial. Gener-
ally, the reasons for excluding certain calculations of probability 
from evidence also pertain to limiting the argument of such calcu-
lations. For example, the argument might result in unfairly preju-
dicial confusion or misleading of the jury.84 
It has been suggested that a jury's overreliance on persuasively 
argued probabilities might displace the proper jury function of de-
termining whether each element of a criminal offense has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.85 Courts have rejected the no-
80. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 150 Ga. App. 41, 43-44, 256 S.E.2d 649, 651·52 
(1979). 
81. Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 768, 95 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1956) (citing Owens v. 
State, 120 Ga. 209, 47 S.E. 545 (1904». 
82. See Wisdom v. State, 234 Ga. 650, 655, 217 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1975). 
83. See Wheeler v. State, 220 Ga. 535, 537, 140 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1965); Sanford v. 
State, 203 Ga. 451, 453, 47 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1948) (quoting Ogletree v. Siate, 115 Ga. 
835, 835-36, 42 S.E. 255, 255 (1902». 
84. CI. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 330, 438 P.2d 33, 40, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 504 
(1968) ("Confronted with an equation which purports to yield a numerical index of 
probable guilt, few juries could resist the temptation to accord disproportionate weight 
to that index ... "). 
85. See id. at 331·32, 438 P.'2d at 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505; State v. Carlson, 267 
N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. 1978); Note, supra note 7, at 334-35. 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 9
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol1/iss1/9
HeinOnline -- 1 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 147 1984-1985
1984] ODDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 147 
tion that a legal burden of proof can or should be evaluated with 
mathematical precision.s6 A "preponderance of the evidence" in a 
civil case cannot be equated with a statistical likelihood greater 
than fifty percent, even though the verbal formulation of the stan-
dard is "more likely than not."S7 Similarly, proof "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" cannot be equated with a probability of 99.9 % or 
with any precise mathematical expression. A prosecutor's argu-
ment to the jury that mathematically expressed probabilities alone 
should satisfy the government's burden of proof may therefore 
constitute reversible error.ss 
Some courts have limited the prosecution's scope of permissible 
inference where statistically invalid calculations have been used. In 
People v. Collins,s9 the Supreme Court of California reversed a 
robbery conviction on various grounds, including the prosecutor's 
use of the testimony of a mathematics professor in such a manner 
as to distract and confuse the jury and the defense.9o The expert 
witness in Collins was qualified to testify regarding mathematical 
calculations, but the prosecution's unfounded assumptions and 
misuse of statistical principles resulted in reversal. 
United States v. Massey91 indicates other pitfalls for the unwary 
or unscrupulous prosecutor. In Massey, the Eighth Circuit re-
versed a robbery conviction partly because the prosecutor had mis-
represented the testimony as to probabilities and because he had 
argued that the statistical evidence "would be proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt because it is so convincing."92 The prosecutor also 
made the mistake of confusing the establishment of a physical link 
between the defendant and the crime scene with the establishment 
of proof of guilt.93 
In United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Franzen,94 the Seventh 
Circuit distinguished Massey on the grounds that the mathemati-
cal evidence used in DiGiacomo's trial was corroborative of an eye-
witness identification, that the prosecutor never argued that the 
mathematically expressed probabilities should be conclusive proof, 
86. See United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1979); Carlson, 267 
N.W.2d at 176. 
87. See Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 470, 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (1945). 
88. See Massey, 594 F.2d at 681. 
89. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). 
90. See id. at 327-32, 438 P.2d at 38-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502-05. 
91. 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979). 
92. [d. at 680-81 (quoted material emphasized in original). 
93. See id. at 681. 
94. 680 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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and that the prosecutor did not confuse the issues of physical asso-
ciation and guilt.911 In DiGiacomo, unlike Massey, the prosecutor's 
argument referred to the probability evidence only as additional 
circumstantial evidence to be considered along with all the other 
evidence.96 The court affirmed the denial of a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus despite the fact that the probability evidence appar-
ently had confused the jury to some ext<:'nt.97 Nevertheless, the 
court acknowledg0d that "the better practice may be ... to in-
struct the jury on the limitations of mathematical probability 
whenever such evidence is admitted .... "98 
Collins, Massey, and DiGiacomo illustrate that the manner in 
which the prosecution uses mathematically expressed probabilities 
after they are in evidence may determine whether a conviction is 
upheld on appeal. However, a recent example of the traditionally 
broad latitude enjoyed in closing argument is found in Roach u. 
State.99 In Roach, an Indiana appellate court upheld a conviction 
in spite of a rambling argument at trial in which the prosecutor 
suggested completely unfounded probabilities to the jury, culmi-
nating in the prosecutor's guess that the odds were one in ten mil-
lion that someone other than the defendant could be the guilty 
party.lOO The Indiana court distinguished Collins on the ground 
that the jurors in Collins were required to accept unproven as-
sumptions as facts, whereas in Roach "the prosecutor merely sup-
plied a method of analyzing the evidence in the record, leaving the 
jurors free to assign any statistical probability to the various 
95. [d. at 518-19. 
96. See id. at 518 n.4. 
97. See id. at 516, 518. 
98. [d. at 519. 
99. 451 N.E.2d 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
100. Although the reported text of the Roach prosecutor's argument is most illumi-
nating, a short excerpt will serve to demonstrate the prosecutor's latitude in closing 
argument: 
Next what's the possibility that this individual with glass in his shoe had 
the same footprints and ultimately ended up in the Defendant's car? . . . 
One in a thousand? One in a hundred? ... One in ten? I don't know. Put 
any value that you feel. Taking these and using the fair figures, one in a 
thousand here on the glass, what's the possibility that all these things 
happened, all these circumstances happened all at the same time? One in 
a thousand here. One in a hundred here .... I don't know. Maybe it's a 
little bit more. Maybe it's a little bit less. But using these amounts, there's 
three, four, five, six, seven zeroes. One in ten million, chances of all these 
things happening. 
[d. at 392. 
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facts. mOl However, the Indiana court's distinction between the ar-
guments in Roach and Collins is illusory; the Collins prosecutor in 
fact did invite the jury to assign its own probabilities, but the con-
viction was nevertheless reversed. l02 
The viewpoint illustrated by Roach is that a prosecutor may use 
mathematically expressed probabilities, even wholly speculative 
ones, as a means of presenting inferences to the jury. Even the 
Roach court, however, indicated its adherence to the rule that a 
prosecutor is not allowed to argue facts not in evidence,103 and this 
rule is also followed in Georgia. l04 The following section of this 
Note will show that, in the absence of particularized standards, a 
prosecutor's closing argument might distort probability testimony 
so subtly that a substantial misrepresentation of the testimony 
might go undetected. 
B. Argument of Mathematically Expressed Probabilities in 
Williams v. State 
The prosecution in Williams, relying on the expert fiber and 
probability evidence, argued: 
[I]n order for there to be another killer in Atlanta with the 
same environment as Wayne Williams, he'd have to have the 
same kind of carpet, same kind of dog, the same kind of bed-
spread, the same kind of blanket, the same kind of toilet cover, 
the same kind of carpet squares, the same kind of ... bed-
spread hanging up in his porch, the same white polyester, the 
same jacket, the same gloves, the same blue rayon, and he'd 
have to have the same hair as Wayne Williams. 1011 
The prosecution's witnesses never attributed such a specific array 
of characteristics to a hypothetical "other killer."106 Nevertheless, 
101. [d. 
102. See Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 325 n.lO, 438 P.2d at 37 n.lO, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501 
n.lO. 
103. Roach, 451 N.E.2d at 392. 
104. See Wheeler, 220 Ga. at 537, 140 S.E.2d at 261; Montos, 212 Ga. at 768, 95 
S.E.2d at 796; Sanford, 203 Ga. at 453, 47 S.E.2d at 270; Patterson v. State, 124 Ga. 
408, 409, 52 S.E. 534, 535 (1905). 
105. Transcript, supra note 3, at 6882-83. 
106. As pointed out in Williams' appellate brief, the prosecutor's argument, al-
though supposedly based on Deadman's probability testimony, "served to confuse the 
jury as to [the] meaning [of the probability testimony] in relation to the other circum-
stantial evidence .... [The probability testimony] had nothing to do with the dog, the 
bedspread ... , the white polyester, the jacket, the glove, the blue rayon, or Wayne 
Williams' hair." Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 115-16. 
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to the extent that the prosecutor might have drawn illogical infer-
ences from the expert testimony, he would have remained within 
the traditional scope of permissible argument.107 In rejecting Wil-
liams' claim that the argument had been improper, the Williams 
majority stated: "Counsel are given wide latitude in closing argu-
ment, and are not prohibited from suggesting to the jury inferences 
which might be drawn from the evidence."lo8 
The prosecutor did more, however, than draw nonmathematical 
inferences from the expert testimony. He also presented to the jury 
mathematically expressed probabilities relating to the fiber evi-
dence.109 These probabilities, purportedly based on an expert's 
analysis, were actually founded on a misstatement of Deadman's 
testimony by the prosecutor. The misstatement substantially al-
tered the essential meaning of the mathematically expressed 
probabilities in evidence. The phrasing of the prosecutor's misquo-
tation, however, was similar to Deadman's actual testimony. Thus, 
given that the significance of mathematically expressed probabili-
ties is easily misunderstood, an average juror or attorney might 
never have noticed the prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence. 
The prosecutor emphasized that the assumptions made by the 
expert, Deadman, had been more than fair to the defendant, and 
reminded the jury of Deadman's opinion that "there would only be 
one chance in eight thousand that there would be another house in 
Atlanta that would have the same kind of carpeting as the Wil-
liams home."llo The prosecutor's statement to the jury actually 
bettered the odds in Deadman's testimony by an extraordinary 
amount and to the benefit of the prosecution. 
Deadman actually said that the odds were one in 7,792 that an 
Atlanta household chosen at random would contain carpet similar 
to Williams' carpet.111 The transformation of the number 7,792 in 
Attorney Lynn Whatley's cooperation in making certain research materials available 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
107. Ct. Wisdom, 234 Ga. at 655,217 S.E.2d at 249 (permitting prosecutorial infer-
ences "however illogical they may seem to the opposite party"); Wheeler, 220 Ga. at 
537, 140 S.E.2d at 261 (citing as grounds for mistrial an argument "which introduces 
facts not in evidence and is calculated to prejudice the defendant, not flights of ora-
tory, figurative speech or false logic"). 
108. Williams, 251 Ga. at 786, 312 S.E.2d at 73 (citing Wisdom v. State, 234 Ga. 650, 
655, 217 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1975». 
109. See Williams, 251 Ga. at 786, 824, 312 S.E.2d at 72-73, 98; Transcript, supra 
note 3, at 6881-82. 
110. Transcript, supra note 3, at 6881. 
111. See id. at 2291; Williams, 251 Ga. at 824, 312 S.E.2d at 98 (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
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Deadman's testimony to 8,000 in the closing argument is not the 
important difference. Even if the prosecutor had said "one chance 
in 7,792" rather than "one chance in 8,000," he still would have 
been misquoting Deadman's analysis in such a way as to greatly 
enhance the significance of Deadman's testimony.1l2 
Deadman's opinion as to the probability of a random household 
containing Luxaire carpet was based on his own estimate that 
there were eighty-two such households in the Atlanta area. Even if 
Williams' home were one of those eighty-two households, 
Deadman's own estimations and assumptions indicate that there 
would be eighty-one other Atlanta households containing Luxaire. 
Therefore, if Williams' home contained Luxaire carpet, and if 
Deadman's own estimations and assumptions were accepted as 
true, the probability that at least one other household in Atlanta 
would have the same type of carpet as Williams' home would be 
one hundred percent,l13 not one in 8,000 as stated by the prosecu-
tor.ll4 Given the complexity of the subject matter, however, the ju-
rors and defense counsel might well have relied on the prosecutor's 
version of Deadman's analysis as an accurate paraphrase. 
The prosecutor then reminded the jury of the testimony that 
only about 600 cars out of two and a half million in the Atlanta 
112 In order to understand fully the explanation in the text, the reader may wish to 
review Deadman's analysis, supra text accompanying notes 42-55, and the prosecutor's 
version of Deadman's testimony, supra text accompanying note 110. 
113. In other words, if Deadman's estimate that there are 82 houses with Luxaire 
carpet were accepted as fact, it would be certain that at least one such house exists 
other than Williams' house. 
If this is not clear, consider the following example. Imagine you have seven nickels 
and three pennies, making a total of ten coins in all. If you select one coin at random, 
the odds of selecting a penny are three out of ten or 3/10. Now take one penny away 
from the set of ten coins. What is the probability now that at least one of the remain-
ing nine coins is a penny? 100%. It is certain that there is at least one penny other 
than the one you took away. 
For a closer analogy to the odds calculated in Williams, try a similar exercise with 
638,910 nickels and 82 pennies. The probability of randomly selecting a penny from 
this set of coins is 82/638,992 or about 1/7,792. Take away one penny. The probability 
that there is at least one penny left in the set of coins is 100%. It is certain that 81 of 
the 82 pennies you started with are still in the set. 
114. Consider the difference in impact on the jury between probabilities of 100% 
and 1/8,000 that another Atlanta household would contain Luxaire carpet. Given 
Deadman's actual testimony that 82 Atlanta households might be expected to contain 
Luxaire carpet, a juror could be confident that Williams' home is merely one of many 
homes which might have the carpet. On the other hand, if there were, as the prosecu-
tor said, a 1/8,000 chance of finding any other house with a carpet like that of Wil-
liams, a juror could easily be convinced that such another house does not exist; after 
all, the odds would be strongly against its existence. 
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area had carpet similar to that in the station wagon driven by Wil-
liams. ll5 The prosecutor apparently figured the odds of choosing 
such a car at random to be about one in 5,000.116 He multiplied 
5,000 by 8,000 "in order to calculate the chances [sic] 'that there is 
another house in Atlanta that has the same kind of carpet as the 
Williams house and that the people who live in that house have 
the same type station wagon as the Williamses do. . . " arriving at 
a probability of one in forty million."1l7 The prosecutor next ad-
justed one of Deadman's "beneficial" assumptions, stating that a 
"more realistic view" would be that a householder using Luxaire 
carpet would probably carpet at least four rooms rather than only 
one.118 Assuming that four rooms per household would be carpeted 
alike, the prosecutor concluded that the likelihood of the existence 
of an Atlanta household with the same kind of carpet and station 
wagon as Williams' was one in 150 million.1l9 
The prosecutor's emphasis on mathematically expressed 
probabilities would have been subjected to close scrutiny in the 
courts that decided People v. Collins120 and United States v. Mas-
sey.121 The combination of unfounded assumptions in Deadman's 
testimony and in the closing argument, the prosecution's reliance 
on a distorted version of the expert's statement, and the potential 
prejudice and misleading effect on the jury might well have re-
sulted in reversal. The majority opinion in Williams, however, did 
not discuss the possibility of limiting the use of mathematically 
expressed probabilities in closing argument. On the contrary, the 
opinion stated merely that inferences suggested to the jury "may 
include those based upon mathematical probabilities."122 
Those portions of the argument which were nonmathematical or 
which were presented to the jury as the product of the prosecutor's 
own reasoning properly could have been considered inferences 
drawn from the evidence and thus within the traditional scope of 
115. Transcript, supra note 3, at 6882. 
116. See id. The prosecutor did not explain how the figure was derived, nor did he 
clearly identify its meaning except in relation to further questionable calculations. 
117. Williams, 251 Ga. at 824,312 S.E.2d at 98 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting, with 
ellipsis, Transcript, supra note 3, at 6882). 
118. Transcript, supra note 3, at 6882; see Williams, 251 Ga. at 824, 312 S.E.2d at 
98 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
119. See Transcript, supra note 3, at 6882; Williams, 251 Ga. at 824, 312 S.E.2d at 
98 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
120. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). 
121. 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979). 
122. Williams, 251 Ga. at 786, 312 S.E.2d at 73. 
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closing argument. The basis of the prosecutor's mathematical cal-
culations, however, which was presented to the jury as a recapitu-
lation of expert testimony, was in fact a misstatement of that testi-
mony which recast its meaning and significance. 
It is conceivable that the prosecutor's misquotation could have 
been challenged successfully as a prejudicial misstatement of the 
testimony or introduction of facts not in the record. This specific 
issue, however, was raised neither at trial nor on appeal/23 al-
though the argument of probabilities generally and other specific 
statements by the prosecution were challenged.124 One possible ex-
planation for this is that the misstatement was not recognized as 
such.1211 An inherent risk of permitting argument of mathematically 
expressed probabilities not subject to special standards is that a 
prejudicial misstatement of probability testimony might go unno-
ticed, uncorrected, and unchallenged. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Expert OpInIOnS of mathematically expressed probabilities are 
inadmissible in some jurisdictions when there is inadequate factual 
foundation upon which to base a relevant opinion, when the meth-
odology used in deriving the probability is unsound, or when the 
risk of distracting, misleading, or confusing the jury outweighs the 
probative value of the probability evidence. Moreover, the prosecu-
tion's use of mathematically expressed probabilities in argument 
may result in a finding of error if the argument misleads the jury 
or hinders its proper functioning. Usually, however, reversal of 
conviction has been based on the concurrence of more than one of 
these misuses of probabilities during trial. 
For three reasons, mathematically expressed probabilities are 
123. Although the prosecutor's closing argument was quoted extensively in Wil-
liams' appellate brief, the misstatement of Deadman's testimony was not specifically 
challenged. Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 113, states that the prosecutor" 'sum-
marized' the fiber evidence and statistics, and added some magic math of his own for 
the jury." This statement, however, apparently refers only to the prosecutor's own cal-
culations, not to the crucial misquotation on which the prosecutor's analysis was 
based. 
124. Williams' challenge to specific prosecutorial statements was contained in Enu-
meration of Error No. 22, Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 207-16, concerning such 
statements as the prosecution's comparison of Williams to Attila the Hun and Adolf 
Hitler. [d. at 211. The Williams court did not address the merits of this challenge 
because no objection had been made at trial. Williams, 251 Ga. at 801-02, 312 S.E.2d 
at 82-83. 
125. In fact, Williams' own appellate brief misquotes Deadman's testimony just as 
the prosecutor did in closing argument. Appellant's Brief, supra note 64, at 120. 
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more likely to mislead or confuse a jury than are other kinds of 
expert testimony. First, the assignment of a numerical quantity to 
the expert's assessment of probability gives the impressjon of sci-
entific accuracy.126 It is difficult to remember that an opinion ex-
pressed in mathematical terms is still merely an opinion. Thus, a 
jury might attach undue weight to the expert's opinion. 
Second, it is the jury's function, not the expert's, to determine 
whether the events which are crucial to the government's case ac-
tually took place. This function necessarily involves the assessment 
of probabilities, although generally by a nonmathematical process. 
Therefore, expert testimony defining the probability of a signifi-
cant event's occurrence could easily invade the province of the 
jury. The jury should not be encouraged to rely on experts' find-
ings of probability which might not be accurate. While trustworthy 
probability evidence can help the jury make a more accurate deter-
mination of the facts, it is reasonable to require additional safe-
guards to insure that mathematically expressed probabilities con-
sidered by the jury are, in fact, reliable. 
Third, there might be misunderstanding of the significance of 
mathematically expressed probabilities which could not be recti-
fied even by competent testimony and cross-examination. It is rel-
atively easy to understand an expert's opinion that a particular 
event happened or did not happen. It is much more difficult to 
comprehend the significance of an "eighty percent chance" that 
the event happened or might happen. Although the concept of an 
"eighty percent chance" might appear simple, the calculation of 
the odds might be erroneous or biased in a way that a juror, judge, 
or attorney would not understand.127 
In late 1983, Judge Deen of the Georgia Court of Appeals and 
Justice Smith of the Supreme Court of Georgia filed opinions indi-
126. Ct. People v. Collins, 68 Ca!. 2d at 330, 438 P.2d at 40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504 
(noting the likelihood that a jury would "accord disproportionate weight to [a numeri-
cal] index"). 
127. As an example of another biased (and invalid) calculation of odds connected 
with the Williams case, consider the following summary of an argument advanced on 
Williams' behalf in his Brief in Support of Motion for Rehearing. If 82 rooms in At-
lanta contain the incriminating fiber, then 81 of those rooms are occupied by innocent 
people. "Therefore, there is 81/82, or 98.7%, chance that Wayne Williams' environ-
ment is that of an innocent man." Brief in Support of Motion for Rehearing at 5-6, 
Williams. If one of 620 similar cars is owned by a guilty person, then "619 out of 620 
similar cars are those of innocent individuals. Therefore, there is a 619/620 or 99.838% 
chance that Appellant's car is that of an innocent individual. Multiplying the two sta-
tistical probabilities involved (81/82 X 619/620) therefore results in a 98.6% 
probability that Appellant is an innocent man .... " [d. at 6. 
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eating their willingness to scrutinize the use of mathematically ex-
pressed probabilities more closely in the future. In Graham v. 
State,128 Judge Deen cited two leading probability cases, People v. 
Collins129 and State v. Sneed,130 and admonished the court to "use 
caution, care and concern when extrapolating possibility results in 
criminal cases based on mathematical and statistical 
probability."131 
Justice Smith, dissenting in Williams, objected initially to the 
"fiber evidence" as failing to satisfy the required test for admission 
of scientific evidence.132 Other portions of his opinion, however, in-
dicate that Justice Smith was not so much concerned with scien-
tific observations and test results as with the "expert testimony 
concerning the alleged uniqueness of two types of carpet fibers."I33 
In Justice Smith's view, although "the proof of the recovery and 
comparison of fibers" was properly admitted,134 the state had 
failed "to lay a foundation sufficient to establish that the method-
ologies its experts used to draw their inferences of significance 
[were] scientifically valid."I311 Justice Smith's opinion is suggestive 
of the viewpoint that Georgia should join the jurisdictions which 
have excluded mathematically expressed probabilities when the 
underlying methodology has not been proven reliable. 
The majority opinion in Williams might be interpreted as per-
mitting expert testimony and argument of mathematically ex-
pressed probabilities without regard to the reliability of the 
probabilities and without regard to the unfair prejudice which 
could result from the use of misleading or erroneous probabilities 
in criminal trials. The possibility that such evidence could hinder 
the proper functioning of the jury and be unfairly prejudicial to 
the defendant should be acknowledged in the future. 
128. 168 Ga. App. 23, 308 S.E.2d 413 (1983). 
129. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). 
130. 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
131. Graham v. State, 168 Ga. App. at 26, 308 S.E.2d at 416 (Deen, J., concurring 
specially). 
132. Williams, 251 Ga. at 821-22, 312 S.E.2d at 96 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
133. ld. at 822, 312 S.E.2d at 97 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
134. ld. at 826, 312 S.E.2d at 99 (Smith, J., dissenting). Justice Smith also consid-
ered as properly admitted the experts' testimony that "fibers found on the victims 
appeared similar to fibers found in the Williams home and car and could have had a 
common origin." ld. 
135. ld. at 821, 312 S.E.2d at 96 (Smith, J., dissenting). "The remaining facts and 
inferences were rank hearsay, unproven assumptions, and guesswork, and should not 
have been admitted by the trial court." ld. at 826, 312 S.E.2d at 99 (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
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The admissibility of mathematically expressed probabilities 
should be subject to defined standards informing the trial court's 
discretion. For example, a showing that the .expert's data and 
methodology are reliable could be required prior to admitting the 
probability evidence. This is the approach suggested by non-Geor-
gia cases such as State v. Sneed136 and by Justice Smith's dissent 
in Williams. 137 An alternative would be to require a preliminary 
finding that the probative value of the probability evidence is not 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. There should also be express 
standards limiting the use of misleading probabilities in closing ar-
gument. In addition, requiring jury instructions which discourage 
excessive reliance on probability testimony or argument might re-
duce the potential for unfair confusion and distraction of the 
jury.13S The Georgia Supreme Court's articulation of standards 
such as these would support an effective jury system and promote 
the fair administration of criminal justice. 
J. James Johnson 
136. 76 N.M. 349, 354, 414 P.2d 858, 861-62 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
137. Cf. Williams, 251 Ga. at 821, 312 S.E.2d at 96 (Smith, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the prosecution failed to show the scientific validity of the experts' methodology). 
138. The desirability of jury instructions was noted in United States ex rei. 
DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 1982). "The jury should ... be 
made to understand that the [frequency of random occurrence] does not in any sense 
measure the probability of the defendant's innocence." Tribe, supra note 24, at 1355. 
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